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finishes a trip, he reports in the next morning for work 
(Tr. G), receiving assigmnents from the di::;patclter (Tr. 
7). 
On the night prior to the morning of the accident 
plaintiff had just completed a trip to Vernal, Utah (Tr. 
7). He signed in at the company yard at about midnight, 
after he completed the trip (Tr. 7). He then drove home, 
slept and left his house in the morning, intending to 
return to the yard (Tr. 7). He was not able to start 
his truck and telephoned the dispatch office (Tr. 3). 
The dispatcher suggested that he check the truck for 
ignition and gas and see what the problem was (Tr. 3). 
He added that if plaintiff were not able to correct the 
problem, he would send help (Tr. 3). ln an effort to 
start the truck, the plaintiff poured gasoline into the 
carburetor while his wife was operating the starter. 
A fire resulted and he was injured (Tr. 4). 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Testimony in the captioned matter was held before 
a hearing officer on November 29, 1965. A ruling was 
handed down· by the Commission on January 25, 1966, 
adverse to the plaintiff. The Commission determined 
that the plaintiff did sustain an injury by accident, but 
that it was not in the course of his employment. The 
plaintiff subsequently petitioned for reh<>aring and rf'-
versal of the Couunis::;ion'::; ord<:·r denying his daim. 
rrhe petition was denied. rl1his appeal followl'd. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT 
Defendants seek an affinnance of the order of the 
lndm;trial Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE LAW AND THE 
RECORD. 
1. The Law Defining "Course of Employment" 
"Course of employment" is a concept which depend:::; 
upon the peculiar circumstances of each case. The ques-
tion may not be resolved by reference to any fixed 
formula. ( 58 Amjur. \Vorkmen 's Compensation, ~210). 
ln very general terms, when an accident takes place 
within the pe1'iod of the employment at a place where 
llw employee reasonably may be in the performance 
of his duties and while he iR fulfilling those duties or 
mgaged in doing something incidental thereto, or as 
sometimes stated, where he is engaged in the furtherance 
of his employer's busines::;, he is considered to be in the 
course of his employment. (Id. ~212). The hazards en-
c-ountered by employees while going to or returning 
fro111 their regnlar place of employment before reaching 
or after reaching the employer'::; premises, are not ordin-
arily incident to the employment, and for this reason 
injnri<.'s resulting from such hazards are in most instances 
1wl<1 not to bP compensabk, as arising out of and in the 
('Olll"S\~ of Pmploynwnt. ( s('(:' Roberts v. l 11dustrial Com-
111ission of l'tah, 7 tTt. 10, -17 P.2d 1052, and Starr Piano 
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Co. v. Industrial Accident Commi...,sion, 181 Cal. 433, 184 
P. 860) (58 Amjur. §217). 
It is true that this general rule is subject in most 
jurisdictions to some exceptions which depend upon the 
nature, circumstances and conditions of the particular 
employment and the course of the injury. TlH' principal 
exceptions are where the employer provides the trans-
portation or remunerates the employee for tlw time or 
expense involved or where the employee performs or 
expects to perform such substantial task or dnty in con-
nection with his employment at home or enroute. (See 
J.lf organ v. Industrial Commission of Utah, GG P.2d 144, 
92 U. 129) (58 Amjur. §217). A further exception to the 
general rule of noncompensability has been made in 
some instances where the employee doPs not work regular 
hours or is subject to call, but not all authorities recog-
nize such an exception. ( 58 Amjur. §217). rrhe presence 
or absence of control by the employer over the acts 
and movements of the employee while traveling to or 
from work, while a factor to be considered in determin-
ing whether an injury received while so traveling is 
compensable, as arising out of and in the course of 
employment, i·s not decisive. (Id. at §217). 
In support of his bri<:>f ,the plaintiff has cited the 
case of Knou:les v. North Dakota lVorknu'11's Compen-
sation Bitreau, 1925, 52 N.D. 563, 203 N.\V. 895. Tlw 
court, in that cas(~, turned its deeision on th<> f'act that 
the applicant in that matter had im;t nwtiom; frn111 a 
::;uperior to deliver the crnployer\; trnek at th<· shops 
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on the morning he was injured, because it was needed 
or intended for certain specific purposes. One of the 
officers or employees of the company testified that appli-
cant was on duty when he was injured. The court went 
on to say that applicant had been engaged on his own 
busjness (he had borrowed the vehicle from his em-
11loyer) and was not within the course of his employment 
and trjed to deliver the company vehicle back to the 
warehouse but found it locked. If, in this attempt, he 
liau been injured, he wonld not have been within the 
course of his employment. Ho\1iever, upon finding the 
\Varehouse locked, he sought instructions from his super-
iors, who told him to take the truck to his home and in 
the morning to drive it, not to the warehouse where it 
had been delivered to him, but to the shops where some 
\rnrk was to be done with it that very morning and by 
the applicant himself. The court said: 
"It is not a case where an employee is injured 
on the way to or from work; he was actually 
at work, obedient to the orders of the employer 
to ddiver the truck at the place where work was 
to be done with it." 
ln t~ffoct, applicant was a servant who owed the implicit 
obedience incident to that statns to begin his services 
under the labor contract by fetching the truck to the 
shops, \Vhere he and it would be put into active service. 
1'he court vvas making a distinction from a bailee-bailor 
rdationship. 
rrhe Bornk ease, also eitt>d hy the plaintiff in sup-
1iort of his position, may be distinguished under the rules 
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set down in a treatise cited by plaintiff, that is, Horowit~ 
Current Trends in \Vorlanen's Compensation. On page 
677 of that work, it is stated that the general rule that 
a worker is not in the course of his employment until he 
crosses the employment threshhold, is subject to some 
exceptions. For instance, off-premise injuries to or from 
work in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable 
if the employee is on his way to or from work in a 
vehicle owned or supplied by the employer and where 
the employer has promised, or hy custom pays for trans-
portation to and from work. An exception has also been 
made in "on call" situations which involYe living on the 
premises, as with domestic seITants, nurses, etc., or 
where a garage mechanic brings his own car to work for 
tow and repair service, etc. The Borak case is distin-
guishable from the instant situation in this particular. 
Additionally, the Utah court has not seen fit to extend 
the coverage of Worlanen's Compensation to this extent. 
Bailey v. Utah State Indiistrial Commission, 398 P.2d 
545, 16 Ut. 2d 208 (1965) is a case cited by plaintiff. 
'l'hat case is distinguishable from the instant case, in 
that (and Judge Callister called it a "close" case) the 
applicant was injured on his ·way to work and his car was 
constantly used for emergency calls at all hours. Fur-
ther, in support of its decision, tlH~ court, in Bailey, 
cited certain Utah cases which it is productive to exam-
ine. 
Fidelity & Casualty ColiljJ(lil,IJ et al. c. f ll(l11strial 
Commission et al., 8 P.2d 617, 79 Ut. u-m, \\·as a cast· in 
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\\'hirh a rnotlwr sought comvensation for the d0ath of 
ltcr son. He was employed by a drug conqmny and lus 
c'mploymtc,11t required him to use a bicycle for the de-
liver)· of Kodak films. He was additionally rel1uired 
to pick up certain films on his way to work and deliver 
tlwm to the plant of his employer. He was supposed 
to nrrive at work at 8 :00 a.rn. on the morning of the 
injury ·which resulted in his death. He had left home but 
11ad not yet arriYed at the place where he was to pick up 
the films wben he \vas hurt. The court denied compensa-
tion on the ground that he was outside the course of his 
employment. They stated the general rule that an injury 
sustained by an employee while going to or returning 
from his place of work is not an injury arising out of 
and in the course of his employment and hence, an injury 
thns snstaim1d is not compensable under ·workmen's 
C'om1Jensation. It also stated that the Utah court is 
committed to such a doctrine. The court said that he 
was not under the control of his employer and the time 
when he was to enter upon his employment had not yet 
arrived. 
Covey Ballard Motor Company u. Industrial 
Com mission, G4 Ut. 1, 227 P. 10:28 is a ease in which a 
commission salesman who had a duty to be at all times 
on the lookout for prospective purchasers and who was 
paid on a commission, was injured at 9 :45 p.rn., while 
driving !tis rar from the motor company to his home. 
Tl1<.• court held that tht> injury did not occur in the course 
oJ' his ('mployment. It said the applicant \Vas riding in 
J1i~ own C'ar and selected his own ronte and that he had 
no prospective purchaser in viPw and none in mind, bnt 
was simply going home after his day's wmk. The court 
said that if it had been shown that he was doing some-
thing which a salesman usually does to secure a pur-
chaser for the wares that he is selling, there might then 
be some basis upon which the award conld be sustained. 
In effect, the court stated that he was not employed, 
that is, performing any function for his employer as part 
of his job at that specific time. 
In the .. Wilson v. Industrial Cuo11ni::;sio11 case, 110 
Ut. 46, 207 P.2d 1116, a elairn was made by de1wndents 
of a deceased party for an Industrial Comrnission award. 
The decedent was a foreman and had been instructed by 
his employer to go out to :Magna and bring an automobile 
back to Salt Lake City but to complete repairs on it in 
Magna before bringing it back. rrhc mt>thod of returning 
the automobile was left entirely up to the decedent. On 
his way out to l\fagna, decedent sustained fatal injuries 
while riding as a passenger in the automobile of another 
party hired by decedent's employer to assi8t decedent. 
Decedent had no regular hours, though he was ordinarily 
expected to corrunence work at 8 :00 A.l\l. rrhe accident 
happened at about 8 :15 A.M. The aecident did not hap1wn 
within the course of decedent's employrnl•nt. The eonrt 
stated the general rule, ·with which the claimant agreed, 
but the claimant pressed for application of the exception 
that an injury sustained by an employev, either on his 
employer's or his own time, arises out of his vmployment 
if the employee is injnred while upon a mission for tlH' 
employer. 
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The court cited Cha11dler v. Industrial Cornrnission, 
(jQ Ut. :387, 208 P. 499, for the proposition that an award 
sl10nld be sustained and a claim granted 'vhere the acci-
dc~nt occurred during a trip which was a distinct part 
of a definite duty - more than merely going to work, 
all(l actually an errand for his employer at the time of 
the accident, and also cited the Kahn Brus. 1_;. 111dustrial 
Commis.<sion case, 75 Ut. 145, 283 P. 1054, for the same 
vropm:;ition .. Judge Latimer, then, speaking for the court 
in the ·Wilson case, said that unless the contract of em-
ployment contemplated that the employer-employee re-
lationship would commence when deceased left his home, 
it would be necessary for the status to be created by 
some special mission enroute to work before deceased 
would be within the protection of the vVorkmen's Com-
pensation Act. It held that this was not the case. 
In conclusion, the essence of the Utah decisions is 
that in order for the exception to the general rule to 
apply, the employee must be engaged in some activity 
other than simply going to or from work, and that 
activity must be on behalf of his employer. 
2. The Comrnission's Order is Snpported by the 
Recorded Evidence. 
The evidence as recorded in the transcript of pro-
ceedings clearly supports a finding that the plaintiff 
was not in the course of his employment at the time 
111· was injured. On the night prior to his accident, the 
plaintiff had n:·turned from a trip to Yernal, Utah, 
aniving· in Salt Lake City around 11 :00 or 12 :00 o'clock 
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at night (Tr. 7). He signed in at the yard on his 
arrival, terminating that trip, and then, as was his habit, 
drove his tractor directly to his home in Bountiful, a 
town located some 12 or 13 miles north of Salt Lab 
City (Tr. 6, 7). On the day of the accideut, the plaintiff 
left his home shortly before 9 :00 a.m. CI1r. 3, 7, 8), and 
attempted to start his truck (Tr. 3). In his own vwrds, 
"he was ready to go to 1vork'' (Tr. 3). He called the 
company dispatcher and told him he could not start 
the truck. The dispatcher logically suggested that he 
check it out for ignition and gas. He further suggested 
that if the plaintiff could not start the truck then, the 
employer would send help to him (Tr. 3). In an effort 
to start the truck, plaintiff poured gasoline in the carb~ 
uretor, while his wife was operating the starter. Not 
surprisingly, a fire started. He was bunwd and this 
claim resulted (Tr. 3-4). Plaintiff's employment arrange-
ment as a trucker for Commercial Carriers, Inc. involved 
his being paid a salary based on tlw loaded trip mile 
(Tr. 5, 12). For pay purposes, mileage begins when he 
leaves the yard with a load. The ICC regulations require 
that he log all his miles, (Tr. 9) but clearly for inspec• 
ti on and safety reasons (Tr. 12). Even if we were to 
accept plaintiff's construction of the ICC regulations, 
that the ICC regulation set the course of employment 
limits, (Tr. 8) his work could not in logic conceivably 
begin under that theory until and unless the truck wern 
moving and accumulating mileage•. He is not paid for 
the miles from his home to tlw yard. Plaintiff owns his 
own tractor, which he leases to Cornuwrcial Carriers, 
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Inc. (Tr. 6). The company owns the trailer (Tr. 6). 
When plaintiff is in town, he reports in for work in the 
morning err. 6-8). \¥hen completing a trip he signs 
in at the yard, establishing his availability for a new 
trip and his priority relative thereto (Tr. 7). His work 
hegins when his dispatcher assigns a load to him, though 
lie estimated, due to his seniority, that he would be given 
a load that morning. This \Vas simply a calculation based 
011 past experience, and he certainly could have been in 
error. More importantly, it is obvious that this calcula-
tion could only have been confirmed by the dispatcher 
the next day, and until it was, he did not have a load to 
carry and was not assnred of pay for that day. The 
dispatching begins at 9 :00 a.m. Essentially, then, at the 
time he was injured, plaintiff was just short of even 
b(~ing on his way to work. Whether or not plaintiff him-
self was a licensed common carrier, a point raised by 
Plaintiff, is not material in the light of the law as 
applied to the record. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no justification nnder Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Law for rehearing this matter or for a 
n~versal or modifying the Commission's determination 
tlierein. Viewed most favorably to plaintiff's position, 
within the scope of the case law, the course of his em-
ploymc-mt began when he left the terminal with a load 
il<'stined for Yernal and rnded when he sigrn~d in at the 
~alt Lak<• City tenuinal. Since he was not on any par-
ticnlar assignment or mission in behalf of his employer 
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a.t the time of injury, the act of attempting to start his 
tractor did not place him in an area exceptional to the 
general rule of law defining the course of employment. 
The Commission has not acted arbitrarily, capriciously 
or contrary to law, and its determination should be sus-
tained and the petition for rehearing denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
By Norman S. Johnson 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
1205 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
